Thoughts on the Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

The meeting between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had been highly anticipated for a number of reasons. Both men had recently ushered in new administrations promising new approaches to their countries' foreign policies. During the campaign, Obama spoke of the advantages of increased diplomacy and the dangers of unilateral military actions, while Netanyahu was widely seen as the candidate least likely to engage in former and most likely to engage in the latter. All these factors contributed to predictions of a clash between the US administration's policies and those favored by Netanyahu. What clues did their first official meeting give to forecast the future relationship between Obama and Netanyahu?

1. The private meeting between the two men lasted almost an hour longer than scheduled. Obama even rearranged his schedule for the day to accommodate the extra time with Netanyahu. This indicates that their discussion was highly substantive.

2. Both men came to the meeting with differing priorities. Netanyahu's top priority was to convince Obama of the urgency of the threat posed by Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, while Obama sought to convey to Netanyahu the importance of continuing the peace process, both for halting Iran's regional ambitions and for overall US goals in the region.

3. Although there had been the possibility of a joint statement, the meeting did not result in one, indicating that any draft resulted in enough disagreement that separate statements became necessary (as retired U.S. ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis pointed out).

4. Netanyahu's real audience was the Knesset and, as such, he was attempting a balancing act. On the one hand, he was conscious of the need to maintain good relations with a popular American president, and therefore he made statements consistent with that objective, stating that Obama is "pro-Israel" and that Israel doesn't intend to rule the Palestinians. On the other hand, despite Netanyahu's coalition with the Labor Party, there are still many in his own Likud party who oppose a Palestinian state. Given Netanyahu's prior refusal to endorse such a state, supporting it at the press conference would have been seen as Netanyahu "caving in" and might have resulted in the fall of his government.

5. Obama also displayed his characteristic diplomatic tact and skill by alluding to the serious threat posed by a nuclear Iran and mentioning that the US was not "foreclosing a range of steps...in assuring that Iran understands that we are serious," while not actually mentioning the possibility of military action. Obama also outlined his disagreements with Netanyahu on a Palestinian state and settlements while at the same time praising Netanyahu, stating: "Netanyahu has the benefit of having served as Prime Minister previously. He has both youth and wisdom and I think is in a position to achieve the security objectives of Israel, but also bring about historic peace. And I'm confident that he's going to seize this moment." This allowed Obama to satisfy both those who were watching to see if he would push to advance the peace process and also those concerned about maintaining a strong US-Israel relationship.

6. While Obama never mentioned the 2002 Arab peace initiative, he did state, "I actually think that you're going to see movement in - among Arab states that we have not seen before." This stance is consistent with both US and Israeli recognition that Iran and its proxies pose not only a threat to Israel, but to other Arab allies of the US including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Shimon Peres in particular has called for taking advantage of that opportunity for closer Israeli-Arab cooperation. Recently, Jordan's King Abdullah has also endorsed this analysis by heavily promoting the Arab peace initiative, even coining the term "57-state solution" to describe the end result of recognition of Israel by the entire Muslim world. Obama's alluding to "movement among Arab states" may suggest that the US agrees that a regional approach should be taken to the peace process, rather than simply continuing bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There has also been talk of Arab states offering Israel new incentives, such as giving El Al the right to fly over Arab airspace and granting visas for Israeli tourists to Arab states, in exchange for Israel freezing settlements and moving a diplomatic process forward.

Obama's speech to the Muslim world from Cairo on June 4th will now be closely watched to see if he will unveil a more specific proposal for the Middle East. While Netanyahu and Obama share the same end-goal with regard to Iran, they may differ on the means to the end. Netanyahu may find that he has trouble balancing the needs of the US with the sentiments of the more right-wing elements in his coalition. Only time will tell if Netanyahu and Obama, both skilled politicians, can find a creative solution that allows both of them to achieve their political goals.

Mideast Court Battles

One of my good friends, Josh Goodman, recently published an article in the WSJ Europe on "lawfare" against Israel. Check it out.

The Iranian Threat Turn Netanyahu into a Peacemaker

Since the formation of the current Israeli Government earlier this year, foreign policy analysts have frequently used adjectives such as "hard-line" and "hawkish" to describe the makeup of the government and by implication, its likely policies. There has been less focus on the deliberate choices Prime Minister Netanyahu has made when forming his coalition and what these choices may signal with regard to the diplomatic path the Israeli government will embark on.

When the election results were certified, it had become clear that the "right-wing bloc" had won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Under Israel's parliamentary system of government, the President of Israel is tasked with asking the leader most capable of assembling a stable coalition to form the next government. Even though the centrist Kadima had received one more Knesset seat than Likud did, President Peres asked Netanyahu to form the next government based on the stronger showing for the parties that comprise Israel's right-wing. What happened next can shed much light onto Netanyahu's political evolution since his failed term as Prime Minister from 1996-1999.

Lessons from Netanyahu's First Term as Israeli PM

Despite the fact that Netanyahu could have put together a stable coalition majority of 65 seats consisting of all of the right-wing parties, he deliberately started working secretly with Ehud Barak, leader of Israel's center-left Labor party, in order to bring him into the coalition. This was a direct result of the lessons that Netanyahu learned from his first term when his parliamentary coalition consisted of exclusively right-wing parties, setting it on a collision course with the United States and the international community. Netanyahu came into office in 1996 on the heels of multiple Hamas suicide bombings and he interpreted his election as a mandate to slow down the peace process with the Palestinians. Despite the Hamas violence, the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 had ushered in an era of optimism and grand expectations that was still present and Netanyahu soon came under pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace process that would culminate in a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians.

Bound by both his coalition partners and the expectations of Israel's Western and Arab allies, Netanyahu managed to bungle his relationships with both sides. He authorized the transfer of the city Hebron to the Palestinian authority, thereby angering his settler allies who attach tremendous national and religious significance to the city. At the same time, he angered the international community with actions deemed unhelpful to the peace process such as opening the Hasmonean Tunnel and bungling an assassination attempt of Hamas' Khaled Me'shal in Jordan which almost caused a complete rupture in Israeli-Jordanian relations only a few years after they had first been established. Netanyahu's demeanor was also an issue recounts Aaron David Miller. In his book "The Much Too Promised Land," Miller relates that during their first meeting in the summer of 1996, Bibi lectured the president about the Arab-Israeli issue, prompting Clinton to expostulate when it was over, "Who the fuck does he think he is? Who's the fucking superpower here?"

Netanyahu learned that one thing Israelis value highly is their relationship with their allies, especially the United States. Their country frequently singled out for condemnation in international forums such as the United Nations, Israelis don't take their friendship with the United States for granted and they trust that their Prime Minister understands the importance of a strong US-Israel relationship. This was a lesson that former Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir learned as well, when his election defeat in 1992 was blamed in part on his public row with then President Bush over the issue of settlements.

Now that Netanyahu is returning to the Prime Minister's office he is not taking the lesson of his first term lightly. His election campaign frequently featured photos with Obama and touted the supposed personal chemistry between the two men. Netanyahu is desperate to leave a successful legacy that will eclipse his previous shortcomings and he knows the key to achieving that is in being able to work with the Obama administration. How can a rightist Israeli Prime Minister and President Obama work together to achieve their goals?

The Labor-Likud Alliance Shows Netanyahu's Pragmatism and Concern about Iran

By forming a government with the Labor Party Netanyahu is sending the signal that he realizes that the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority must move forward. This is reflected in Barak's response to Haaretz was asked about Netanyahu's declaration that he will "not return to the 1967 lines or evacuate the Golan Heights."

Barak:

"Look at what Menachem Begin said in the election campaign and what he did afterward [referring to the return of the Sinai to Egypt]. Look at what Netanyahu said 12 years ago and what he did afterward [referring to the transfer of Hebron to Palestinian control]. Look at what I said and what I was ready to do [referring to dividing Jerusalem]. I say, take only these examples and you will understand that Bibi has a hard choice to make: Does he want to be Shamir or Begin? There is a deep understanding between us on the need to address the political issue and that it is impossible to leave things in a state of paralysis. If we sink into paralysis, we are liable to find...acceptance by the world that the solution is not two states for two nations but one state for two nations, which for us is a concrete risk, a slippery slope."

Indeed Netanyahu's campaign did not specifically focus on the Palestinian issue. These signs point to a certain pragmatism with regard to negotiations with the Palestinians. The dream of permanent Israeli borders that stretch from the Mediterranean to the Jordan river is over for anyone in the Israeli political mainstream. But if Netanyahu is willing to compromise on this issue, what will he likely demand in return? Action on Iran's nuclear program.

Israeli journalist Aluf Benn has written that Netanyahu, who has a reputation of being unprincipled, is actually being extremely straightforward and honest with he speaks of the the Iranian nuclear threat.

"Netanyahu has compared Iran to Nazi Germany and its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Adolf Hitler, and has spoken of the international community's silence in the face of both threats - in 1938 and at present...His role model is Winston Churchill, the man who warned about Germany's strengthening in the 1930s and was considered an eccentric right-wing militarist until he was called upon to save Britain in World War II, after his doomsday prophecies came true. Like him, Netanyahu also sees himself as a prophet at the gate, who saw the dangers of terror and extremist Islam before others did, and has now received a second chance to prove the justice of his claims and remove the threats to Israel and the Jewish people."

Netanyahu understands that in order to convince Obama of the seriousness of the Iranian threat and the need for action he will have to gain favor with Obama by moving the diplomatic process forward with the Palestinians, something that Obama has always considered a priority. This point was underscored during a meeting between Clinton and Netanyahu where she endorsed the idea of "linkage" - where diplomatic progress between Israel and the Arabs is necessary to enlist Arab support against Iran.

In his trip to the US this past week Shimon Peres also spoke of "linkage." In an interview with Joe Scarborough Peres stated, "for the first time, most of the Arab world, which are Sunnis, are supporting Israel more than Iran." The fact that the Arab regimes and Israel are both threatened by the rise of Iran and its imperial ambitions present an unprecedented opportunity for an Israeli-Arab partnership in confronting Tehran. Arab regimes like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia recognize that Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hizballah, represent the biggest threat to their stability. Just last month Egypt arrested 49 Hizballah operatives whose mission was to destabilize the Mubarak regime. The Arab-Israeli peace process is an integral component of the multi-pronged approach to stemming Iran's influence. By moving the process forward, Israel can weaken support for Iranian proxies Hamas and Hizballah, strengthen the moderate forces of Fatah, and perhaps shift Syria into the Western axis and out of the Iranian orbit. By picking Barak as his coalition partner, Netanyahu may be signaling that he is prepared to do what it takes not only to avoid a clash with Obama, but to redefine his legacy as someone who managed to stem the threat that eclipses all others, Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions.