Iraq: What Now?

Since a few weeks ago, we have finally seen a turning point with regards to the War in Iraq. The turning point has nothing to do with actual events occurring on the ground in Iraq, but rather with our own administration's acknowledgement of a situation that has been steadily deteriorating for the past 3 years.

On October 18, Bush was asked by George Stephanopoulous whether he agrees with columnist Thomas Friedman who had written in a New York Times that day that the situation in Iraq may be compared to the Tet offensive in Vietnam 40 years earlier. His answer?

"He could be right...There's certainly a stepped-up level of violence, and we're heading into an election."

The Tet offensive was a combined offensive by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army against South Vietnamese and US forces. Even though the Communist forces failed to achieve their tactical goals and sustained massive casualties, the offensive was a hugpropagandada victory for the Vietcong and public opinion against the Vietnam war continued to grow. President Johnson saw his support fall sharply and withdrew as a candidate in March 1968.

The White House sought to clarify Bush's remarks by stating:

"The full context was that the comparison was about the propaganda waged in the Tet Offensive...and the president was reiterating something he's said before - that the enemy is trying to shake our will," spokeswoman Dana Perino said in a statement.

Nevertheless, Bush comparing the current Iraq war with a war that history regards as a failure should be an acknowledgment of a change of attitude from the President, (even among critics who claim hpossesseses an ignorance on historical issues such as the Vietnam war stemming from his political apathy during the 1960's's).

If this wasn't confirmation enough, a week later the White House announced that Bush would refrain from using the now familiar catch-phrase, "Stay the Course". "He's stopped using it," said Tony Snow, the White House press secretary. "It left the wrong impression about what was going on and it allowed critics to say, `Well, here's an administration that's just embarked upon a policy and not looking at what the situation is,' when, in fact, it is the opposite." Bush has not used the phrase since a stump speech back in August.

The developments coincide with reports that the US failed to track weapons shipments going to Iraq, has had a falling out with the Prime Minister of Iraq, and has suffered one of the deadliest months in terms of troop casualties.

Those hoping for a refreshing, forthright and honesassessmentnt of the war shouldn't get their hopes up explains George Will in Newsweek.

Fareed Zakaria, also in the current Newsweek, explains that the best hope for Iraq can be a result somewhat like the Korean War:

For Americans, the Korean War was not a defeat the United States had gathered a coalition to resist aggression but it was certainly not a victory. After three years of fighting and 4 million dead, Korea remained divided. The North a communist bulwark, the South itself turning into a nasty dictatorship. Asia was bubbling over and the danger of war with the forces of international communism seemed greater than before.

Something like the close of the Korean War is, frankly, the best we can hope for in Iraq now. One could easily imagine worse outcomes - a bloodbath, political fragmentation, a tumultuous flood of refugees and a surge in global terrorist attacks. But with planning, intelligence, execution and luck, it is possible that the American intervention in Iraq could have a gray ending - one that is unsatisfying to all, but that prevents the worst scenarios from unfolding, secures some real achievements and allows the United States to regain its energies and strategic compass for its broader leadership role in the world.

Meanwhile, Anthony Cordesman at The Center For Strategic and International Studies has a new report, (The Almost Good, The Bad, and the Ugly) out on options for Iraq that includes, among the "ugly" options, supporting an Iraqi strongman or a coup! So much for "Freedom".

Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV

Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra Television are major American government funded media outlets that target audiences in the Arab world. There are special stations for different regions and there is special attention paid to the Iraqi version of Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa.

There have been mixed reviews of Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra. Radio Sawa's playlist is a strange hybrid of Western pop artists such as Brittany Spears and Christina Aguilera and contemporary Arab pop songs. Interspliced amidst the music are short news clippings and short discussions on topics that brush on questions of values such as "would you marry someone outside your religion?" and "how do you feel about freedom of the press?" (To sample this for yourselves simply click here).

This has made Radio Sawa popular throughout the Arab world but left a debate as to the effectiveness of the station. The station is known as a provider of pop music and there is rarely a level of debate beyond the surface level.

Al-Hurra TV is a newer initiative that has so far been unable to penetrate the Arab media market. To understand some of the reasons for this simply go over to Abu Aardvark blog who has an exhaustive list of posts about the failure of Al-Hurra.

Just recently it was announced that Muwafic Harb, who was brought over from Al-Hayat to be in charge of this endeavor, announced his resignation. Is this a signal that the American administration recognizes the present difficulties and problems and may attempt a new approach to public media diplomacy? From Abu Aardvark:

Muwafic Harb has (finally) resigned, and there will be a total revamping of the station's management and programming. The trigger was the recent audit by the GAO, which presented a pretty damning picture of the station's management practices and creative use of audience research. Elaph also speculates that the US government finally recognized that after two years, the station had failed to penetrate the Arab TV market, present more daring or important programming than its rivals, or have its intended effects on Arab public opinion. The station had been forgotten, ignored by even the American government which rarely granted al-Hurra exclusive news or interviews.

The United States would do well to consider some of the ideas of Robert Satloff (who incidentally was a critic of Al-Hurra before being offered his own talk show on the station) in his book The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.

In the book, Satloff recounts his 2 years in Morocco and his travels throughout the Middle East to deduce certain problems with the current American approach to democracy. Instead of advocating for US policies, all too often administration speakers and media initiatives patronize Arabs by attempting to seduce them with Western culture (a la radio sawa) or appeal for Arab support on the basis of shared values and the emphasis on the status of Muslims in the US showcasing successful Muslim immigrants. The failure of this approach was seen during Karen Hughs

Critics of the US government correctly argue that part of the reason for the unpopularity of the US in the Arab world is its policies and therefore if the US believes in its policies, it must present persuasive arguments and explain to Arabs why the US acts as it does as opposed to treating Arabs like children who will be seduced by a Western pop song or a story of a Muslim immigrant in America.

Arab Public Opinion and Perceptions of Violence

Arab Public Opinion and Perceptions of Violence

What is Changing?

Fares Braizat

CSIS
October 10, 2006


On October 10, 2006, Fares Braizat, a visiting fellow at CSIS, presented data from polling on Arab Public Opinion regarding violence, terrorism, and militant groups in the Middle East and came to some interesting conclusions:

Trends

1. Overall, there is diminishing support for violence and violent groups.
2. There is support for radicals OUTSIDE of the respondents home country.

Polling Data shows that the Arab public is increasingly uncomfortable with violence and terror. At the same time, the Arab public is growing more radical in their opposition to US and Israeli policy in Palestine and Iraq. The paradox is that there is more disagreement with the US and Israel, but not more support for terror tactics and radical groups.

This effect could be due to negative consequences militant groups are having in their own societies. Support for Hamas has gone down in Palestine as a result of increasing lawlessness and poverty there. Support for Al-Qaeda has decreased substantially in Jordan (presumably as a result of the Amman hotel bombings). Hizballah's actions and armament are still contested issues in Lebanon where many question the utility of capturing Israeli soldiers and provoking a harsh response.

On the other hand, all these organizations, have broad support in the greater Arab World. The percentage of Sunnis in Lebanon who have a positive view of Hassan Nasrallah stands at 50% while the percentage of Sunnis in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and other Sunni Arab states who favor Nasrallah exceeds 70%. Support for Hizballah in Palestine is much higher than support for Hamas in Palestine and for Hizballah in Lebanon while support for Hamas is higher in Arab states outside of Palestine than it is in the Palestinian territories.

There is a clear trend of Arab public more likely to support outside insurgencies or those with a global audience like Iraq and Palestine on an emotional level. There is a sense of satisfaction among Arabs that these organizations are able to stand up to Israel and the United States but also a recognition that these movements can have destructive consequences for their home societies.

There is a majority of Jordanians and Palestinians who are in favor of negotiations with Israel and 43% of Lebanese who are in favor of a peace treaty with Israel. Public opinion is turning more moderate at home, but more radical with respect to other countries.