Is Iran weaker than we think?
Tensions between Israel, Iran, and the United States have heated up even further in a renewed round of sabre-rattling and accusations: Iran test-launched several missiles allegedly capable of reaching Israel, and has dredged up some rather dubious claims that Israel is secretly holding Iranian diplomats that disappeared during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the American and British navies recently wrapped up a simulated operation to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which Iran has threatened to target in the event it is attacked.
Yet, at the same time, Israel just sealed a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Syria and Israel are friendlier and closer than ever to direct talks. What gives?
It is possible that Iran, whose strength in the region has been apparently burgeoning, may have overplayed its hand and is bluffing right now to keep its tough image up, when, in fact, it faces a relative deterioration in its regional power in the future. Here are some reasons why that might be:
First, the U.S. revised its National Intelligence Estimate to suggest the Iranian nuclear program was less advanced and aggressive than previously thought.
Second, the recent gains in security in Iraq weaken Iran's status and influence in its traditional regional rival.
Third, there are reports that U.S. covert operations in Iran are underway, perhaps as a way to counteract Iranian operations in Iraq.
Fourth, Syria, not long ago Iran's best friend, now appears to be trying to get back into the good graces of the West, and has become curiously cordial with Israel, a peculiar development considering that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear weapons site in Syria last fall. As discussed in a previous post, it appears that this airstrike triggered some kind of turning point in the shifting relationships between Israel, Syria, and Iran, and it is possible that Syria invited the attack to eliminate an Iranian-affiliated military target on its territory.
Fifth, when a new president is elected in the United States in November -- either McCain or Obama -- the U.S. will attempt to cast off the legacy of George W. Bush and rebuild its international reputation. Therefore, there will presumably be less "reward" for reflexively anti-American behavior, and greater multilateral, international consequences for rogue actions. This, in part, explains why Syria wants to distance itself from Iran, and why Iran's status as U.S. public enemy number one will bring it less cachet come November.
Iran, with its opaque government structure, is a difficult country to read, but one thing is clear -- a war between Israel and the United States and Iran should be avoided. Israeli military officials often speak as if they are compelled to act militarily to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, though, stopping weapons development in Iran is not a goal the Israeli military (or the U.S. military) can reliably achieve because Iran has anticipated such attacks and has hidden and distributed its facilities accordingly. An attack on Iran would merely ignite a destructive regional war with fronts likely at least in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel, and the global oil supply coming out of the Persian Gulf would be cut off, leading to dire ramifications. That's why the best way to deal with Iran remains through diplomacy and containment.
Yet, at the same time, Israel just sealed a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Syria and Israel are friendlier and closer than ever to direct talks. What gives?
It is possible that Iran, whose strength in the region has been apparently burgeoning, may have overplayed its hand and is bluffing right now to keep its tough image up, when, in fact, it faces a relative deterioration in its regional power in the future. Here are some reasons why that might be:
First, the U.S. revised its National Intelligence Estimate to suggest the Iranian nuclear program was less advanced and aggressive than previously thought.
Second, the recent gains in security in Iraq weaken Iran's status and influence in its traditional regional rival.
Third, there are reports that U.S. covert operations in Iran are underway, perhaps as a way to counteract Iranian operations in Iraq.
Fourth, Syria, not long ago Iran's best friend, now appears to be trying to get back into the good graces of the West, and has become curiously cordial with Israel, a peculiar development considering that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear weapons site in Syria last fall. As discussed in a previous post, it appears that this airstrike triggered some kind of turning point in the shifting relationships between Israel, Syria, and Iran, and it is possible that Syria invited the attack to eliminate an Iranian-affiliated military target on its territory.
Fifth, when a new president is elected in the United States in November -- either McCain or Obama -- the U.S. will attempt to cast off the legacy of George W. Bush and rebuild its international reputation. Therefore, there will presumably be less "reward" for reflexively anti-American behavior, and greater multilateral, international consequences for rogue actions. This, in part, explains why Syria wants to distance itself from Iran, and why Iran's status as U.S. public enemy number one will bring it less cachet come November.
Iran, with its opaque government structure, is a difficult country to read, but one thing is clear -- a war between Israel and the United States and Iran should be avoided. Israeli military officials often speak as if they are compelled to act militarily to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, though, stopping weapons development in Iran is not a goal the Israeli military (or the U.S. military) can reliably achieve because Iran has anticipated such attacks and has hidden and distributed its facilities accordingly. An attack on Iran would merely ignite a destructive regional war with fronts likely at least in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel, and the global oil supply coming out of the Persian Gulf would be cut off, leading to dire ramifications. That's why the best way to deal with Iran remains through diplomacy and containment.
Labels: Iran, Israel, Missile Test, nuclear program, Syria




