The Road Map, Annapolis, and a possible US-Israel clash

Certain publications have recently opined on an upcoming policy clash between the Obama administration and the newly-elected Netanyahu government in Israel. The disagreements have been communicated through a series of speeches; most notably the first press conference of the new Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, and Obama's speech to the Turkish parliament in Ankara.

The line most quoted from Lieberman's press conference was, "There is one document that obligates us - and that's not the Annapolis conference, it has no validity," The document he was referring to was the international peace plan known as the Road Map, signed in 2003, while Lieberman stated, "the Israeli government never ratified Annapolis, nor did parliament".

The difference is crucial. The Road Map for peace was a plan presented by the "Quartet" of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia in the spring of 2003. While the plan did present itself as a "framework" for a two state solution, it was a "performance-based" plan with three phases. The third phase, which includes resolving the most contentious issues such as Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and final borders, could only come about once the first 2 phases have been completed. The first phase calls for the Palestinian Authority to "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."

This is the reason why Lieberman has no issue with the Road Map. As long as the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, remain too weak to confront Hamas, the Israelis know that the Road Map will not progress to the third phase where the tough politically-sensitive issues and concessions will have to be considered.

The Annapolis conference on the other hand, was a last ditch effort by Condleeza Rice to expedite the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Its aim was to break the "deadlock" that had resulted from the "performance based" Road Map. While the principles of the Road Map were still valid, the Annapolis declaration called for the immediate establishment of a steering committee to deal with the all outstanding issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas would meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up on the negotiations conducted by the steering committee.

As long as the Palestinian Authority government remains to weak to confront Hamas, the current Israeli government can point to the Road Map to point out that the Palestinians have not met their stage 1 obligations and therefore Israel will not have to deal with concessions and negotiations that may cause their right leaning coalition to fall apart.

President Obama, who has never made a secret of his commitment to be an active participant in the promotion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, made a point to specifically mention Annapolis in his speech to the Turkish parliament stating, "Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security... That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the Road Map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as president."

While the statement is ambiguous enough as to leave room for the Israelis and Palestinians to each claim their own interpretations of it, the mention of Annapolis, like everything else in a President's speech, was carefully calculated. By mentioning Annapolis and Israel's security in the same breath, the President was throwing a bone to the moderate Muslim world, letting them know that he would be involved in a process neglected by his predecessor, while at the same time reassuring the majority of Americans who continue to be sympathetic to Israel and its security needs.

The question remains: Why push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement at a time when Palestinian political disunity between Fatah and Hamas makes the implementation of such a comprehensive settlement impossible at this time? Some may point to statements by US officials that seem to signal that the US may be open to dealing with a Fatah-Hamas unity government, especially if Hamas can be co-opted into controlling the violence and rocket fire that it has been causing Israel's southern region. Still, that possibility seems remote while Obama is a pragmatist at heart. Others believe that if Israel and the Palestinians can present an attractive peace agreement to the Palestinian public, Hamas will be forced to support the agreement lest they become politically irrelevant. The problem with this scenario is that as an armed actor, Hamas will have the ability to subvert the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The last Gaza war accomplished just that with regards to the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Palestinian rocket fire or terror attacks force the Israeli government to react which then sets back support for the political process among both the Israeli and Palestinian public.

The more likely reason that Obama voices support for the process is that in this case, he believes that the process may have value regardless of the likelihood that it culminates in a grand peace agreement. As long as the process continues and there can be even minimal progress towards Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, dismantling of illegal settlements, lifting of roadblocks, and helping the Palestinian economy - the conflict can be "managed." The problem again is that Hamas, as an armed actor, can use violence to interrupt the political process as it sees fit. Eventually, the moderate actors in the Middle East including Israel and the Palestinian Authority will have to find a way to deal with Hamas and its supporters if they ever hope to move toward reconciliation.

Is Iran weaker than we think?

Tensions between Israel, Iran, and the United States have heated up even further in a renewed round of sabre-rattling and accusations: Iran test-launched several missiles allegedly capable of reaching Israel, and has dredged up some rather dubious claims that Israel is secretly holding Iranian diplomats that disappeared during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the American and British navies recently wrapped up a simulated operation to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which Iran has threatened to target in the event it is attacked.

Yet, at the same time, Israel just sealed a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Syria and Israel are friendlier and closer than ever to direct talks. What gives?

It is possible that Iran, whose strength in the region has been apparently burgeoning, may have overplayed its hand and is bluffing right now to keep its tough image up, when, in fact, it faces a relative deterioration in its regional power in the future. Here are some reasons why that might be:

First, the U.S. revised its National Intelligence Estimate to suggest the Iranian nuclear program was less advanced and aggressive than previously thought.

Second, the recent gains in security in Iraq weaken Iran's status and influence in its traditional regional rival.

Third, there are reports that U.S. covert operations in Iran are underway, perhaps as a way to counteract Iranian operations in Iraq.

Fourth, Syria, not long ago Iran's best friend, now appears to be trying to get back into the good graces of the West, and has become curiously cordial with Israel, a peculiar development considering that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear weapons site in Syria last fall. As discussed in a previous post, it appears that this airstrike triggered some kind of turning point in the shifting relationships between Israel, Syria, and Iran, and it is possible that Syria invited the attack to eliminate an Iranian-affiliated military target on its territory.

Fifth, when a new president is elected in the United States in November -- either McCain or Obama -- the U.S. will attempt to cast off the legacy of George W. Bush and rebuild its international reputation. Therefore, there will presumably be less "reward" for reflexively anti-American behavior, and greater multilateral, international consequences for rogue actions. This, in part, explains why Syria wants to distance itself from Iran, and why Iran's status as U.S. public enemy number one will bring it less cachet come November.

Iran, with its opaque government structure, is a difficult country to read, but one thing is clear -- a war between Israel and the United States and Iran should be avoided. Israeli military officials often speak as if they are compelled to act militarily to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, though, stopping weapons development in Iran is not a goal the Israeli military (or the U.S. military) can reliably achieve because Iran has anticipated such attacks and has hidden and distributed its facilities accordingly. An attack on Iran would merely ignite a destructive regional war with fronts likely at least in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel, and the global oil supply coming out of the Persian Gulf would be cut off, leading to dire ramifications. That's why the best way to deal with Iran remains through diplomacy and containment.

Did Syria secretly tell Israel to bomb its own nuclear reactor?

A new report claims that the al-Kibar weapons site that Israel bombed in Syria last year was working to aid the Iranian nuclear program, with the help of North Korean scientists.

First, there are some questionable elements to this report. It is unclear why the Iranians would want to house one of their research facilities in a shaky country like Syria, or to share nuclear knowledge with the Syrians. And it appears somewhat convenient that this story comes out now: Israel and Syria have been very friendly (relatively speaking) lately, while Israel just finished a major military drill designed to send a public message of warning to Iran -- and now suddenly this nuclear site was an Iranian site after all.

However, let's assume that the story is accurate. Here's a novel theory about what may have been going on behind the scenes, and how Israel found out about al-Kibar in the first place. Maybe the Iranians basically forced the weapons site on their weaker ally, Syria, a few years ago so that they could conduct the more weapons-related part of their nuclear research far from the watchful eyes of the IAEA, and with plausible deniability as to Iranian involvement. Having enough problems of its own, Syria was unhappy about being used as Iran's nuclear playground, but, internationally isolated and domestically shaky, the Syrian regime couldn't very well tell their biggest ally, Iran, to buzz off and do their dirty work elsewhere. So instead they secretly invited their old friends the Israelis to clean up the mess. That would explain how the Israelis found out about the site and how they were able to destroy it so easily. That would also explain not only why the Syrians have been so very quiet after having their country bombed by Israel, but also why relations between Syria and Israel have apparently improved dramatically in the wake of the incident -- with current speculation about direct talks and a possible Olmert-Assad handshake.

Israel's Mid-Life Crisis

At 60, Israel appears to be going through what the cliches of pop psychology might call a mid-life crisis. Since the exit of Ariel Sharon, the last larger-than-life leader from the days of Israel's youth, everything has seemed just a bit blah for Israel. Here are some key symptoms of the crisis:

* Self-questioning - The secular majority in Israel seems to have lost its moral bearings and sense of purpose. This is not necessarily praise for the religious population, since their own moral vision can often be insular and restrictive. Yossi Klein Halevi puts the problem succinctly:

When socialism waned, the society lost its moral certainties. No official ethos has replaced Labor Zionism. Add three more factors--the rise of consumerism, the constant threat of war and terrorism, and the ongoing occupation--and the strain on ethical norms becomes formidable.

* Conspicuous consumption and indulgence in luxuries - Hello, Ehud Olmert. While Olmert is probably somewhat unfairly vilified for his extravagances (which aren't really that extreme, he has become a symbol of corruption, hedonism, and moral bankruptcy among Israel's leadership. Similar indulgences in corruption and hedonism among Palestinian Fatah leaders, combined with the inability of those leaders to achieve political goals, led to the erosion of popular support for Fatah and the rise of Hamas. Unfortunately, there is no party in Israel that can claim freedom from corruption--certainly not the religious parties. As an individual leader, Tzipi Livni has the cleanest hands around, if only because they are the least experienced.

* Sexual affairs, especially with someone much younger - The prime exhibit is Moshe Katsav, Israel's previous President, who was accused of rape. Of course, sexual affairs are nothing new, but Katsav's hesitance to resign contributed to the sense of shamefulness and crisis.

* A deep sense of remorse for goals not accomplished - Peace process, anyone? After 60 years, it's still a crowd-pleaser in much of the Muslim world to rant about wiping Israel off the map. Israelis are asking what, if anything, have they accomplished in terms of gaining acceptance from their neighbors?

* Desire to achieve a feeling of youthfulness - The military glories of Israel's youth resound in the national consciousness, but they are increasingly remote memories in a country that feels impotent in light of today's threats, despite its large military arsenal. The inconclusive Second Lebanon War was a major national embarrassment, as are the daily rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns from Gaza--not to mention the steady stream of belligerent verbal abuse wafting over from Iran.

How to cope?

The best treatment for a mid-life crisis is to change one's mental outlook, finding new purpose in your life without giving into quick fixes and poor decisions. It will take a new, younger generation of political leaders to restore faith, credibility, optimism, hope and a sense of civic mission to in Israel. Those leaders need to stand up soon, because political, military, and social challenges loom large on the horizon.