The Road Map, Annapolis, and a possible US-Israel clash

Certain publications have recently opined on an upcoming policy clash between the Obama administration and the newly-elected Netanyahu government in Israel. The disagreements have been communicated through a series of speeches; most notably the first press conference of the new Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, and Obama's speech to the Turkish parliament in Ankara.

The line most quoted from Lieberman's press conference was, "There is one document that obligates us - and that's not the Annapolis conference, it has no validity," The document he was referring to was the international peace plan known as the Road Map, signed in 2003, while Lieberman stated, "the Israeli government never ratified Annapolis, nor did parliament".

The difference is crucial. The Road Map for peace was a plan presented by the "Quartet" of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia in the spring of 2003. While the plan did present itself as a "framework" for a two state solution, it was a "performance-based" plan with three phases. The third phase, which includes resolving the most contentious issues such as Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and final borders, could only come about once the first 2 phases have been completed. The first phase calls for the Palestinian Authority to "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."

This is the reason why Lieberman has no issue with the Road Map. As long as the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, remain too weak to confront Hamas, the Israelis know that the Road Map will not progress to the third phase where the tough politically-sensitive issues and concessions will have to be considered.

The Annapolis conference on the other hand, was a last ditch effort by Condleeza Rice to expedite the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Its aim was to break the "deadlock" that had resulted from the "performance based" Road Map. While the principles of the Road Map were still valid, the Annapolis declaration called for the immediate establishment of a steering committee to deal with the all outstanding issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas would meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up on the negotiations conducted by the steering committee.

As long as the Palestinian Authority government remains to weak to confront Hamas, the current Israeli government can point to the Road Map to point out that the Palestinians have not met their stage 1 obligations and therefore Israel will not have to deal with concessions and negotiations that may cause their right leaning coalition to fall apart.

President Obama, who has never made a secret of his commitment to be an active participant in the promotion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, made a point to specifically mention Annapolis in his speech to the Turkish parliament stating, "Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security... That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the Road Map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as president."

While the statement is ambiguous enough as to leave room for the Israelis and Palestinians to each claim their own interpretations of it, the mention of Annapolis, like everything else in a President's speech, was carefully calculated. By mentioning Annapolis and Israel's security in the same breath, the President was throwing a bone to the moderate Muslim world, letting them know that he would be involved in a process neglected by his predecessor, while at the same time reassuring the majority of Americans who continue to be sympathetic to Israel and its security needs.

The question remains: Why push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement at a time when Palestinian political disunity between Fatah and Hamas makes the implementation of such a comprehensive settlement impossible at this time? Some may point to statements by US officials that seem to signal that the US may be open to dealing with a Fatah-Hamas unity government, especially if Hamas can be co-opted into controlling the violence and rocket fire that it has been causing Israel's southern region. Still, that possibility seems remote while Obama is a pragmatist at heart. Others believe that if Israel and the Palestinians can present an attractive peace agreement to the Palestinian public, Hamas will be forced to support the agreement lest they become politically irrelevant. The problem with this scenario is that as an armed actor, Hamas will have the ability to subvert the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The last Gaza war accomplished just that with regards to the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Palestinian rocket fire or terror attacks force the Israeli government to react which then sets back support for the political process among both the Israeli and Palestinian public.

The more likely reason that Obama voices support for the process is that in this case, he believes that the process may have value regardless of the likelihood that it culminates in a grand peace agreement. As long as the process continues and there can be even minimal progress towards Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, dismantling of illegal settlements, lifting of roadblocks, and helping the Palestinian economy - the conflict can be "managed." The problem again is that Hamas, as an armed actor, can use violence to interrupt the political process as it sees fit. Eventually, the moderate actors in the Middle East including Israel and the Palestinian Authority will have to find a way to deal with Hamas and its supporters if they ever hope to move toward reconciliation.