Thoughts on the Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

The meeting between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had been highly anticipated for a number of reasons. Both men had recently ushered in new administrations promising new approaches to their countries' foreign policies. During the campaign, Obama spoke of the advantages of increased diplomacy and the dangers of unilateral military actions, while Netanyahu was widely seen as the candidate least likely to engage in former and most likely to engage in the latter. All these factors contributed to predictions of a clash between the US administration's policies and those favored by Netanyahu. What clues did their first official meeting give to forecast the future relationship between Obama and Netanyahu?

1. The private meeting between the two men lasted almost an hour longer than scheduled. Obama even rearranged his schedule for the day to accommodate the extra time with Netanyahu. This indicates that their discussion was highly substantive.

2. Both men came to the meeting with differing priorities. Netanyahu's top priority was to convince Obama of the urgency of the threat posed by Iran and its quest for nuclear weapons, while Obama sought to convey to Netanyahu the importance of continuing the peace process, both for halting Iran's regional ambitions and for overall US goals in the region.

3. Although there had been the possibility of a joint statement, the meeting did not result in one, indicating that any draft resulted in enough disagreement that separate statements became necessary (as retired U.S. ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis pointed out).

4. Netanyahu's real audience was the Knesset and, as such, he was attempting a balancing act. On the one hand, he was conscious of the need to maintain good relations with a popular American president, and therefore he made statements consistent with that objective, stating that Obama is "pro-Israel" and that Israel doesn't intend to rule the Palestinians. On the other hand, despite Netanyahu's coalition with the Labor Party, there are still many in his own Likud party who oppose a Palestinian state. Given Netanyahu's prior refusal to endorse such a state, supporting it at the press conference would have been seen as Netanyahu "caving in" and might have resulted in the fall of his government.

5. Obama also displayed his characteristic diplomatic tact and skill by alluding to the serious threat posed by a nuclear Iran and mentioning that the US was not "foreclosing a range of steps...in assuring that Iran understands that we are serious," while not actually mentioning the possibility of military action. Obama also outlined his disagreements with Netanyahu on a Palestinian state and settlements while at the same time praising Netanyahu, stating: "Netanyahu has the benefit of having served as Prime Minister previously. He has both youth and wisdom and I think is in a position to achieve the security objectives of Israel, but also bring about historic peace. And I'm confident that he's going to seize this moment." This allowed Obama to satisfy both those who were watching to see if he would push to advance the peace process and also those concerned about maintaining a strong US-Israel relationship.

6. While Obama never mentioned the 2002 Arab peace initiative, he did state, "I actually think that you're going to see movement in - among Arab states that we have not seen before." This stance is consistent with both US and Israeli recognition that Iran and its proxies pose not only a threat to Israel, but to other Arab allies of the US including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Shimon Peres in particular has called for taking advantage of that opportunity for closer Israeli-Arab cooperation. Recently, Jordan's King Abdullah has also endorsed this analysis by heavily promoting the Arab peace initiative, even coining the term "57-state solution" to describe the end result of recognition of Israel by the entire Muslim world. Obama's alluding to "movement among Arab states" may suggest that the US agrees that a regional approach should be taken to the peace process, rather than simply continuing bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There has also been talk of Arab states offering Israel new incentives, such as giving El Al the right to fly over Arab airspace and granting visas for Israeli tourists to Arab states, in exchange for Israel freezing settlements and moving a diplomatic process forward.

Obama's speech to the Muslim world from Cairo on June 4th will now be closely watched to see if he will unveil a more specific proposal for the Middle East. While Netanyahu and Obama share the same end-goal with regard to Iran, they may differ on the means to the end. Netanyahu may find that he has trouble balancing the needs of the US with the sentiments of the more right-wing elements in his coalition. Only time will tell if Netanyahu and Obama, both skilled politicians, can find a creative solution that allows both of them to achieve their political goals.

Mideast Court Battles

One of my good friends, Josh Goodman, recently published an article in the WSJ Europe on "lawfare" against Israel. Check it out.

The Iranian Threat Turn Netanyahu into a Peacemaker

Since the formation of the current Israeli Government earlier this year, foreign policy analysts have frequently used adjectives such as "hard-line" and "hawkish" to describe the makeup of the government and by implication, its likely policies. There has been less focus on the deliberate choices Prime Minister Netanyahu has made when forming his coalition and what these choices may signal with regard to the diplomatic path the Israeli government will embark on.

When the election results were certified, it had become clear that the "right-wing bloc" had won a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Under Israel's parliamentary system of government, the President of Israel is tasked with asking the leader most capable of assembling a stable coalition to form the next government. Even though the centrist Kadima had received one more Knesset seat than Likud did, President Peres asked Netanyahu to form the next government based on the stronger showing for the parties that comprise Israel's right-wing. What happened next can shed much light onto Netanyahu's political evolution since his failed term as Prime Minister from 1996-1999.

Lessons from Netanyahu's First Term as Israeli PM

Despite the fact that Netanyahu could have put together a stable coalition majority of 65 seats consisting of all of the right-wing parties, he deliberately started working secretly with Ehud Barak, leader of Israel's center-left Labor party, in order to bring him into the coalition. This was a direct result of the lessons that Netanyahu learned from his first term when his parliamentary coalition consisted of exclusively right-wing parties, setting it on a collision course with the United States and the international community. Netanyahu came into office in 1996 on the heels of multiple Hamas suicide bombings and he interpreted his election as a mandate to slow down the peace process with the Palestinians. Despite the Hamas violence, the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 had ushered in an era of optimism and grand expectations that was still present and Netanyahu soon came under pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace process that would culminate in a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians.

Bound by both his coalition partners and the expectations of Israel's Western and Arab allies, Netanyahu managed to bungle his relationships with both sides. He authorized the transfer of the city Hebron to the Palestinian authority, thereby angering his settler allies who attach tremendous national and religious significance to the city. At the same time, he angered the international community with actions deemed unhelpful to the peace process such as opening the Hasmonean Tunnel and bungling an assassination attempt of Hamas' Khaled Me'shal in Jordan which almost caused a complete rupture in Israeli-Jordanian relations only a few years after they had first been established. Netanyahu's demeanor was also an issue recounts Aaron David Miller. In his book "The Much Too Promised Land," Miller relates that during their first meeting in the summer of 1996, Bibi lectured the president about the Arab-Israeli issue, prompting Clinton to expostulate when it was over, "Who the fuck does he think he is? Who's the fucking superpower here?"

Netanyahu learned that one thing Israelis value highly is their relationship with their allies, especially the United States. Their country frequently singled out for condemnation in international forums such as the United Nations, Israelis don't take their friendship with the United States for granted and they trust that their Prime Minister understands the importance of a strong US-Israel relationship. This was a lesson that former Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir learned as well, when his election defeat in 1992 was blamed in part on his public row with then President Bush over the issue of settlements.

Now that Netanyahu is returning to the Prime Minister's office he is not taking the lesson of his first term lightly. His election campaign frequently featured photos with Obama and touted the supposed personal chemistry between the two men. Netanyahu is desperate to leave a successful legacy that will eclipse his previous shortcomings and he knows the key to achieving that is in being able to work with the Obama administration. How can a rightist Israeli Prime Minister and President Obama work together to achieve their goals?

The Labor-Likud Alliance Shows Netanyahu's Pragmatism and Concern about Iran

By forming a government with the Labor Party Netanyahu is sending the signal that he realizes that the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority must move forward. This is reflected in Barak's response to Haaretz was asked about Netanyahu's declaration that he will "not return to the 1967 lines or evacuate the Golan Heights."

Barak:

"Look at what Menachem Begin said in the election campaign and what he did afterward [referring to the return of the Sinai to Egypt]. Look at what Netanyahu said 12 years ago and what he did afterward [referring to the transfer of Hebron to Palestinian control]. Look at what I said and what I was ready to do [referring to dividing Jerusalem]. I say, take only these examples and you will understand that Bibi has a hard choice to make: Does he want to be Shamir or Begin? There is a deep understanding between us on the need to address the political issue and that it is impossible to leave things in a state of paralysis. If we sink into paralysis, we are liable to find...acceptance by the world that the solution is not two states for two nations but one state for two nations, which for us is a concrete risk, a slippery slope."

Indeed Netanyahu's campaign did not specifically focus on the Palestinian issue. These signs point to a certain pragmatism with regard to negotiations with the Palestinians. The dream of permanent Israeli borders that stretch from the Mediterranean to the Jordan river is over for anyone in the Israeli political mainstream. But if Netanyahu is willing to compromise on this issue, what will he likely demand in return? Action on Iran's nuclear program.

Israeli journalist Aluf Benn has written that Netanyahu, who has a reputation of being unprincipled, is actually being extremely straightforward and honest with he speaks of the the Iranian nuclear threat.

"Netanyahu has compared Iran to Nazi Germany and its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Adolf Hitler, and has spoken of the international community's silence in the face of both threats - in 1938 and at present...His role model is Winston Churchill, the man who warned about Germany's strengthening in the 1930s and was considered an eccentric right-wing militarist until he was called upon to save Britain in World War II, after his doomsday prophecies came true. Like him, Netanyahu also sees himself as a prophet at the gate, who saw the dangers of terror and extremist Islam before others did, and has now received a second chance to prove the justice of his claims and remove the threats to Israel and the Jewish people."

Netanyahu understands that in order to convince Obama of the seriousness of the Iranian threat and the need for action he will have to gain favor with Obama by moving the diplomatic process forward with the Palestinians, something that Obama has always considered a priority. This point was underscored during a meeting between Clinton and Netanyahu where she endorsed the idea of "linkage" - where diplomatic progress between Israel and the Arabs is necessary to enlist Arab support against Iran.

In his trip to the US this past week Shimon Peres also spoke of "linkage." In an interview with Joe Scarborough Peres stated, "for the first time, most of the Arab world, which are Sunnis, are supporting Israel more than Iran." The fact that the Arab regimes and Israel are both threatened by the rise of Iran and its imperial ambitions present an unprecedented opportunity for an Israeli-Arab partnership in confronting Tehran. Arab regimes like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia recognize that Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hizballah, represent the biggest threat to their stability. Just last month Egypt arrested 49 Hizballah operatives whose mission was to destabilize the Mubarak regime. The Arab-Israeli peace process is an integral component of the multi-pronged approach to stemming Iran's influence. By moving the process forward, Israel can weaken support for Iranian proxies Hamas and Hizballah, strengthen the moderate forces of Fatah, and perhaps shift Syria into the Western axis and out of the Iranian orbit. By picking Barak as his coalition partner, Netanyahu may be signaling that he is prepared to do what it takes not only to avoid a clash with Obama, but to redefine his legacy as someone who managed to stem the threat that eclipses all others, Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions.

The Road Map, Annapolis, and a possible US-Israel clash

Certain publications have recently opined on an upcoming policy clash between the Obama administration and the newly-elected Netanyahu government in Israel. The disagreements have been communicated through a series of speeches; most notably the first press conference of the new Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, and Obama's speech to the Turkish parliament in Ankara.

The line most quoted from Lieberman's press conference was, "There is one document that obligates us - and that's not the Annapolis conference, it has no validity," The document he was referring to was the international peace plan known as the Road Map, signed in 2003, while Lieberman stated, "the Israeli government never ratified Annapolis, nor did parliament".

The difference is crucial. The Road Map for peace was a plan presented by the "Quartet" of the US, the EU, the UN, and Russia in the spring of 2003. While the plan did present itself as a "framework" for a two state solution, it was a "performance-based" plan with three phases. The third phase, which includes resolving the most contentious issues such as Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and final borders, could only come about once the first 2 phases have been completed. The first phase calls for the Palestinian Authority to "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."

This is the reason why Lieberman has no issue with the Road Map. As long as the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, remain too weak to confront Hamas, the Israelis know that the Road Map will not progress to the third phase where the tough politically-sensitive issues and concessions will have to be considered.

The Annapolis conference on the other hand, was a last ditch effort by Condleeza Rice to expedite the Israeli-Palestinian political process. Its aim was to break the "deadlock" that had resulted from the "performance based" Road Map. While the principles of the Road Map were still valid, the Annapolis declaration called for the immediate establishment of a steering committee to deal with the all outstanding issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas would meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up on the negotiations conducted by the steering committee.

As long as the Palestinian Authority government remains to weak to confront Hamas, the current Israeli government can point to the Road Map to point out that the Palestinians have not met their stage 1 obligations and therefore Israel will not have to deal with concessions and negotiations that may cause their right leaning coalition to fall apart.

President Obama, who has never made a secret of his commitment to be an active participant in the promotion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, made a point to specifically mention Annapolis in his speech to the Turkish parliament stating, "Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security... That is a goal that the parties agreed to in the Road Map and at Annapolis. That is a goal that I will actively pursue as president."

While the statement is ambiguous enough as to leave room for the Israelis and Palestinians to each claim their own interpretations of it, the mention of Annapolis, like everything else in a President's speech, was carefully calculated. By mentioning Annapolis and Israel's security in the same breath, the President was throwing a bone to the moderate Muslim world, letting them know that he would be involved in a process neglected by his predecessor, while at the same time reassuring the majority of Americans who continue to be sympathetic to Israel and its security needs.

The question remains: Why push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement at a time when Palestinian political disunity between Fatah and Hamas makes the implementation of such a comprehensive settlement impossible at this time? Some may point to statements by US officials that seem to signal that the US may be open to dealing with a Fatah-Hamas unity government, especially if Hamas can be co-opted into controlling the violence and rocket fire that it has been causing Israel's southern region. Still, that possibility seems remote while Obama is a pragmatist at heart. Others believe that if Israel and the Palestinians can present an attractive peace agreement to the Palestinian public, Hamas will be forced to support the agreement lest they become politically irrelevant. The problem with this scenario is that as an armed actor, Hamas will have the ability to subvert the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The last Gaza war accomplished just that with regards to the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Palestinian rocket fire or terror attacks force the Israeli government to react which then sets back support for the political process among both the Israeli and Palestinian public.

The more likely reason that Obama voices support for the process is that in this case, he believes that the process may have value regardless of the likelihood that it culminates in a grand peace agreement. As long as the process continues and there can be even minimal progress towards Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, dismantling of illegal settlements, lifting of roadblocks, and helping the Palestinian economy - the conflict can be "managed." The problem again is that Hamas, as an armed actor, can use violence to interrupt the political process as it sees fit. Eventually, the moderate actors in the Middle East including Israel and the Palestinian Authority will have to find a way to deal with Hamas and its supporters if they ever hope to move toward reconciliation.

More evidence that Iran is exaggerating

The photos released of the latest missile test were apparently doctored to show more missiles than were actually launched.

That would also explain why some reports claim nine missiles were originally launched, yet according to this report:

Analysts said an early assessment showed that U.S. tracking systems detected seven missile launches, including a version of Tehran's longer-range Shahab-3, which officials have said has a range of 1,250 miles. Intelligence analysts were studying data from radar, satellites and other tracking systems to determine the distance it traveled, look at its accuracy and so on, one official said.

Is Iran weaker than we think?

Tensions between Israel, Iran, and the United States have heated up even further in a renewed round of sabre-rattling and accusations: Iran test-launched several missiles allegedly capable of reaching Israel, and has dredged up some rather dubious claims that Israel is secretly holding Iranian diplomats that disappeared during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the American and British navies recently wrapped up a simulated operation to protect oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which Iran has threatened to target in the event it is attacked.

Yet, at the same time, Israel just sealed a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Syria and Israel are friendlier and closer than ever to direct talks. What gives?

It is possible that Iran, whose strength in the region has been apparently burgeoning, may have overplayed its hand and is bluffing right now to keep its tough image up, when, in fact, it faces a relative deterioration in its regional power in the future. Here are some reasons why that might be:

First, the U.S. revised its National Intelligence Estimate to suggest the Iranian nuclear program was less advanced and aggressive than previously thought.

Second, the recent gains in security in Iraq weaken Iran's status and influence in its traditional regional rival.

Third, there are reports that U.S. covert operations in Iran are underway, perhaps as a way to counteract Iranian operations in Iraq.

Fourth, Syria, not long ago Iran's best friend, now appears to be trying to get back into the good graces of the West, and has become curiously cordial with Israel, a peculiar development considering that Israel bombed a suspected nuclear weapons site in Syria last fall. As discussed in a previous post, it appears that this airstrike triggered some kind of turning point in the shifting relationships between Israel, Syria, and Iran, and it is possible that Syria invited the attack to eliminate an Iranian-affiliated military target on its territory.

Fifth, when a new president is elected in the United States in November -- either McCain or Obama -- the U.S. will attempt to cast off the legacy of George W. Bush and rebuild its international reputation. Therefore, there will presumably be less "reward" for reflexively anti-American behavior, and greater multilateral, international consequences for rogue actions. This, in part, explains why Syria wants to distance itself from Iran, and why Iran's status as U.S. public enemy number one will bring it less cachet come November.

Iran, with its opaque government structure, is a difficult country to read, but one thing is clear -- a war between Israel and the United States and Iran should be avoided. Israeli military officials often speak as if they are compelled to act militarily to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, though, stopping weapons development in Iran is not a goal the Israeli military (or the U.S. military) can reliably achieve because Iran has anticipated such attacks and has hidden and distributed its facilities accordingly. An attack on Iran would merely ignite a destructive regional war with fronts likely at least in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel, and the global oil supply coming out of the Persian Gulf would be cut off, leading to dire ramifications. That's why the best way to deal with Iran remains through diplomacy and containment.

Did Syria secretly tell Israel to bomb its own nuclear reactor?

A new report claims that the al-Kibar weapons site that Israel bombed in Syria last year was working to aid the Iranian nuclear program, with the help of North Korean scientists.

First, there are some questionable elements to this report. It is unclear why the Iranians would want to house one of their research facilities in a shaky country like Syria, or to share nuclear knowledge with the Syrians. And it appears somewhat convenient that this story comes out now: Israel and Syria have been very friendly (relatively speaking) lately, while Israel just finished a major military drill designed to send a public message of warning to Iran -- and now suddenly this nuclear site was an Iranian site after all.

However, let's assume that the story is accurate. Here's a novel theory about what may have been going on behind the scenes, and how Israel found out about al-Kibar in the first place. Maybe the Iranians basically forced the weapons site on their weaker ally, Syria, a few years ago so that they could conduct the more weapons-related part of their nuclear research far from the watchful eyes of the IAEA, and with plausible deniability as to Iranian involvement. Having enough problems of its own, Syria was unhappy about being used as Iran's nuclear playground, but, internationally isolated and domestically shaky, the Syrian regime couldn't very well tell their biggest ally, Iran, to buzz off and do their dirty work elsewhere. So instead they secretly invited their old friends the Israelis to clean up the mess. That would explain how the Israelis found out about the site and how they were able to destroy it so easily. That would also explain not only why the Syrians have been so very quiet after having their country bombed by Israel, but also why relations between Syria and Israel have apparently improved dramatically in the wake of the incident -- with current speculation about direct talks and a possible Olmert-Assad handshake.

Israel's Mid-Life Crisis

At 60, Israel appears to be going through what the cliches of pop psychology might call a mid-life crisis. Since the exit of Ariel Sharon, the last larger-than-life leader from the days of Israel's youth, everything has seemed just a bit blah for Israel. Here are some key symptoms of the crisis:

* Self-questioning - The secular majority in Israel seems to have lost its moral bearings and sense of purpose. This is not necessarily praise for the religious population, since their own moral vision can often be insular and restrictive. Yossi Klein Halevi puts the problem succinctly:

When socialism waned, the society lost its moral certainties. No official ethos has replaced Labor Zionism. Add three more factors--the rise of consumerism, the constant threat of war and terrorism, and the ongoing occupation--and the strain on ethical norms becomes formidable.

* Conspicuous consumption and indulgence in luxuries - Hello, Ehud Olmert. While Olmert is probably somewhat unfairly vilified for his extravagances (which aren't really that extreme, he has become a symbol of corruption, hedonism, and moral bankruptcy among Israel's leadership. Similar indulgences in corruption and hedonism among Palestinian Fatah leaders, combined with the inability of those leaders to achieve political goals, led to the erosion of popular support for Fatah and the rise of Hamas. Unfortunately, there is no party in Israel that can claim freedom from corruption--certainly not the religious parties. As an individual leader, Tzipi Livni has the cleanest hands around, if only because they are the least experienced.

* Sexual affairs, especially with someone much younger - The prime exhibit is Moshe Katsav, Israel's previous President, who was accused of rape. Of course, sexual affairs are nothing new, but Katsav's hesitance to resign contributed to the sense of shamefulness and crisis.

* A deep sense of remorse for goals not accomplished - Peace process, anyone? After 60 years, it's still a crowd-pleaser in much of the Muslim world to rant about wiping Israel off the map. Israelis are asking what, if anything, have they accomplished in terms of gaining acceptance from their neighbors?

* Desire to achieve a feeling of youthfulness - The military glories of Israel's youth resound in the national consciousness, but they are increasingly remote memories in a country that feels impotent in light of today's threats, despite its large military arsenal. The inconclusive Second Lebanon War was a major national embarrassment, as are the daily rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns from Gaza--not to mention the steady stream of belligerent verbal abuse wafting over from Iran.

How to cope?

The best treatment for a mid-life crisis is to change one's mental outlook, finding new purpose in your life without giving into quick fixes and poor decisions. It will take a new, younger generation of political leaders to restore faith, credibility, optimism, hope and a sense of civic mission to in Israel. Those leaders need to stand up soon, because political, military, and social challenges loom large on the horizon.